28.1.11
"The Design of Performance Pay in Education"
Capitulo do novo Handbook of the Economics of Education (vol. 4), por Derek Neal (Chicago).
Abstract: This chapter analyzes the design of incentive schemes in education while reviewing empirical studies that evaluate performance pay programs for educators. Several themes emerge. First, it is difficult to use one assessment system to create both educator performance metrics and measures of student achievement. To mitigate incentives for coaching, incentive systems should employ assessments that vary in both format and item content. Separate no-stakes assessments provide more reliable information about student achievement because they create no incentives for educators to take hidden actions that contaminate student test scores. Second, relative performance schemes are rare in education even though they are more difficult to manipulate than systems built around psychometric or subjective performance standards. Third, assessment-based incentive schemes are mechanisms that complement rather than substitute for systems that promote parental choice, e.g. vouchers and charter schools.
Sobre o caso portugues (as reformas na avaliacao de professores introduzidas a partir de 2007), e baseando-se no meu trabalho sobre o tema, Neal escreve:
Martins does not have an experimental control sample, but the results he reports are so negative that it is difficult to believe that the Portuguese system produced any real achievement gains for students, and students may have been harmed.
In private firms, the person who evaluates a worker’s performance is either an owner of the firm or an agent of the owner. In public education, subjective performance evaluation is more problematic because many principals and administrators work under employment and salary rules that create only weak links between the quality of their personnel decisions and their own compensation. Thus, some may not be surprised that performance pay systems that involve one group of public employees making subjective determinations about the bonus payments given to another group of public employees did not generate noteworthy gains in student achievement.
Capitulo do novo Handbook of the Economics of Education (vol. 4), por Derek Neal (Chicago).
Abstract: This chapter analyzes the design of incentive schemes in education while reviewing empirical studies that evaluate performance pay programs for educators. Several themes emerge. First, it is difficult to use one assessment system to create both educator performance metrics and measures of student achievement. To mitigate incentives for coaching, incentive systems should employ assessments that vary in both format and item content. Separate no-stakes assessments provide more reliable information about student achievement because they create no incentives for educators to take hidden actions that contaminate student test scores. Second, relative performance schemes are rare in education even though they are more difficult to manipulate than systems built around psychometric or subjective performance standards. Third, assessment-based incentive schemes are mechanisms that complement rather than substitute for systems that promote parental choice, e.g. vouchers and charter schools.
Sobre o caso portugues (as reformas na avaliacao de professores introduzidas a partir de 2007), e baseando-se no meu trabalho sobre o tema, Neal escreve:
Martins does not have an experimental control sample, but the results he reports are so negative that it is difficult to believe that the Portuguese system produced any real achievement gains for students, and students may have been harmed.
In private firms, the person who evaluates a worker’s performance is either an owner of the firm or an agent of the owner. In public education, subjective performance evaluation is more problematic because many principals and administrators work under employment and salary rules that create only weak links between the quality of their personnel decisions and their own compensation. Thus, some may not be surprised that performance pay systems that involve one group of public employees making subjective determinations about the bonus payments given to another group of public employees did not generate noteworthy gains in student achievement.
